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Compulsory or Voluntary Pre-merger Notification?
Theory and Some Evidence
Abstract
We compare the prevailing system of compulsory pre-merger notification with the
Australian system of voluntary pre-merger notification. It is shown that, for a
non-trivial set of parameter values, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in mixed
strategies in which the regulator investigates un-notified mergers with probability
less than one and the parties choose notification with probability less than one.
Thanks to the signaling opportunity that arises when notification is voluntary,
voluntary notification leads to lower enforcement costs for the regulator and lower
notification costs for the merging parties. Some of the theoretical predictions are
supported by exploratory empirical tests using merger data from Australia. Over-
all, our results suggest that voluntary merger notification may achieve objectives
similar to those achieved by compulsory systems at lower costs to the merging
parties as well as to the regulator.
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1. Introduction
In a significant number of jurisdictions around the world, pre-merger notification
is considered essential to allow governments either to stop anticompetitive merg-
ers or to negotiate remedies with the parties. The fundamental rationale for such
notification provisions is to give the regulatory bodies time to challenge merg-
ers, and seek modifications if necessary, before they are realized. It also avoids the
costly and complicated process of seeking an order through the courts to unscram-
ble a merger after it has been consummated. While a handful of countries such
as Argentina, Japan, and Russia have post-merger notification regimes, various
pre-merger review policies have proliferated recently around the world, notably in
new democracies and developing economies. According to Battistoni (2002), there
are more than seventy jurisdictions around the world (excluding the U.S. and the
E.U.) that have some form of pre-merger review, and the UNCTAD reports giv-
ing over 50 developing or transition economies technical assistance in the area of
competition policy since 1980.
The dominant pre-merger notification model follows the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (modified in 2000) of the United States (HSR
Act), which requires certain types of transactions to be notified to the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. The stated purpose of the
HSR Act is to give the regulators 30 days’ notice of substantial mergers, which
permits either agency to seek an injunction before consummation of a transaction.
In the European Community, the requirements have been similar to those in the
US since 1990.(1) The differences between the various notification procedures are
mostly in such details as the thresholds for notification and the time allowed for
consideration of the proposal.
Among the various merger notification systems, the US and European systems
of compulsory notification have been much analyzed for their effectiveness, with a
general consensus that the systems work reasonably well.(2) However, as systems
(1) Battistoni (2002) provides details about modifications in the HSR Act that became effective
in 2001. Aktas et al. (2004) provide details about the pre-merger notification procedure and
control in the EC.
(2) See, for example, Baer (1997), Baer and Redcay (2001), and Blumenthal (1997) for related
commentaries.
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of compulsory pre-merger notification have multiplied throughout the world in re-
cent years, increasing attention has been paid to the related issues of associated
costs and requirements, especially involving mergers of multinational corporations.
A recent study commissioned by the American Bar Association and International
Competition Network estimated that the average external costs associated with
complying with notification procedures for mergers covering multiple jurisdictions
amounted to 3.28 million euros, with average review duration of approximately
seven months.(3) In another study, Todaro and Walsh (2002) report that merger
reviews often required filing of multiple applications in a myriad of different for-
mats in many different languages. Additionally, despite the regulator’s efforts to
keep notification confidential, pre-merger notification may allow speculators and
rival bidders to cash in on the entrepreneurial insight of the notifying firm, while it
awaits clearance from the regulator. Finally, delays to completion of notified merg-
ers also imply reduced incentives for entrepreneurs to find and exploit profitable
opportunities.
In view of the costs and complexities associated with compulsory notification,
the primary objective of this study is to analyze a system of voluntary notifica-
tion and to examine whether compulsory notification is necessary for consumer
protection and the efficient functioning of an antitrust merger policy. We address
these issues by studying an existing voluntary merger notification regime. There
are countries such as Australia, Chile, and the UK that have no legal rule requir-
ing pre-merger notification.(4) In Australia, for example, the Trade Practices Act
of 1974 proscribes mergers that substantially lessen competition, but it does not
compel pre-merger notification. Instead, parties to a transaction are given the op-
tion of voluntary notification before they consummate the merger. The regulator,
however, can challenge a completed merger that was not notified.
There are two main differences between the compulsory and voluntary no-
tification regimes. First, the parties’ notification decision under the voluntary
notification regime signals private information regarding the merger, which the
(3) Report on the Costs and Burdens of Multi-jurisdictional Merger Review, November 2004,
International Competition Network (www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org).
(4) EC regulations, however, effectively over-ride the UK provisions, implying pre-merger
notification in the UK (Aktas et al. (2004)).
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regulator can utilize in its enforcement activities. The parties may choose to no-
tify because they are less confident that their mergers will be left intact if they face
the regulator’s investigation; they would prefer negotiated settlement to costly le-
gal battles. On the other hand, the parties may choose not to notify either because
they are confident that their mergers do not cause anti-trust concerns or because,
even when they are subject to regulatory investigation ex post, they are willing
to face legal battles. However, compulsory notification deprives the parties of
such a signaling opportunity. Second, under compulsory notification, the parties
have the opportunity to negotiate with the regulator before the merger is consum-
mated, thereby avoiding costly litigation.(5) Moreover the negotiation may result
in an outcome with higher social welfare. This is the main rationale for, and the
potential benefit of, compulsory notification. On the other hand, compulsory no-
tification entails reviewing costs for the regulator (for each and every submission),
and notification costs for for the merging parties themselves.(6) The available ev-
idence suggests that significant part of these costs may be unnecessary.(7) Under
voluntary notification, large part of such costs can be avoided, precisely because of
the signaling opportunity discussed above. Therefore the choice of compulsory or
voluntary notification should depend on weighing the potential benefits of higher
social welfare from negotiation against the costs discussed above.
In light of the preceding discussion, we present a model where each merger
is represented by private benefits to the merging parties and some proxy of the
regulator’s objectives, which is simply called social welfare. Both parameters are
private information to the parties, which the regulator can learn only at some
costs. The parties maximize private benefits less any costs involved, which include
(5) As we discuss in Section 2.1, negotiation is also an option under voluntary notification if
the regulator investigates a merger before completion.
(6) In case of the US, Tritell (2000) reports that the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice receive about 4500-5000 notifications annually, about a three-fold increase
compared to a decade ago. Among various notification costs are the filing fees under the HSR
Act that range from US$45,000 to US$280,000 depending on the value of transaction, and the
penalties for late filing, which could be as much as US$11,000 per day for each day a filing should
have been made.
(7) Fels and Walker (1994) report that a large number of mergers in Australia involve com-
petitively neutral transactions, and the vast majority do not infringe the Trade Practices Act.
The Australian evidence also suggests that there are only a few midnight mergers that have
anti-competitive consequences. Until the mid-1990s, the Petersville/General Jones merger was
the only example of such a merger (Industry Commission (1995)).
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the costs of notification and litigation-related costs. The regulator maximizes
social welfare less any enforcement costs. The extensive-form game starts with
the parties’ notification decision, in which the system of compulsory notification
is embedded as a subgame that follows the parties’ notification decision.
Our primary results are as follows. Under compulsory notification, we show
that all mergers are separated into three groups: those with small private benefits
are settled into negotiated outcomes; those with large private benefits but low
social welfare are challenged by the regulator and contested in the court; those
with large private benefits and high social welfare are cleared. Under voluntary
notification, we show that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in mixed strate-
gies in which only the parties with small private benefits and low social welfare
choose notification but with probability less than one and subsequently settle into
negotiated outcomes, while the regulator investigates un-notified mergers with
probability less than one. Given the regulator’s investigation, the outcomes for
un-notified mergers are: mergers with high social welfare are cleared; mergers with
large private benefits but low social welfare are challenged by the regulator and
contested in the court; mergers with small private benefits and low social welfare
are challenged by the regulator and the parties do not offer defense. Comparing
the two notification regimes, we find that all merging parties favor voluntary no-
tification over compulsory notification, while regulatory burden is smaller under
voluntary notification. It is also shown that voluntary notification does not lead
to more litigation than compulsory notification. Our calibrated numerical exam-
ples demonstrate that, for a reasonable set of parameter values, the cost savings
under voluntary notification outweigh the welfare gains from negotiation under
compulsory notification.
We also conduct some exploratory empirical tests using merger data from
Australia. Comparison of private benefits to parties measured by abnormal stock
returns indicates that there is no significant difference between notified and un-
notified mergers. It is also found that, for mergers that are not objected to by
the regulator, notifying parties experience lower abnormal returns than those that
choose not to notify. Although the empirical results are not unambiguous since
a vast majority of notified mergers are cleared eventually, the difference may be
attributed to both notification costs and the delay in waiting for clearance from
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the regulator. At least some of these firms could avoid these costs by not notifying
and just proceeding with the merger. Overall, our results suggest that volun-
tary merger notification does work and may achieve objectives similar to those
achieved by compulsory systems at much lower costs to the parties as well as to
the regulator.
Although there is a large body of empirical literature that employs stock mar-
ket data to study the efficacy of regulatory regimes, a direct comparison of our
paper with these studies may not be appropriate as they are based on European
and US merger regimes where notification is compulsory. However, Aktas et al.
(2004) and Fee and Thomas (2004) report that firms involved in transactions facing
regulatory challenge experienced strong positive returns, which is consistent with
some implication of our analysis. We discuss some of these studies in more detail
in Section 4. While much attention has been paid to empirical analyses of merger
policies, there is a paucity of theoretical studies that analyze the optimal merger
notification policy. Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) study a dynamic merger game
where the antitrust authority can be either myopic or forward looking. Lagerlo¨f
and Heidhues (2005) analyze the merging parties’ incentives to gather and strate-
gically reveal efficiency-related information to the regulator. In both of the above
studies, pre-merger notification is assumed compulsory. Although our theory is
focused mainly on comparison of merger notification regimes, it is also related to
work by Besanko and Spulber (1989), Hahn (2000), and Neven and Ro¨ller (2005),
who model various aspects of regulatory decision making vis-a`-vis mergers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins by briefly
describing the voluntary notification regime of Australia, which is followed by an
extensive-form game of the merger process. Section 3 solves the game and shows
by an example that, for a reasonable set of parameter values, voluntary notification
dominates compulsory notification. Section 4 discusses empirical implications of
the model and reports empirical results for Australian mergers. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. A Model of Pre-Merger Notification
This section presents a model of pre-merger notification regime. While our model
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can be applied to any voluntary notification regime, it is based on the merger
process in Australia. This will help motivate the extensive form game laid out
below.
2.1. Merger process in Australia
In Australia, the Trade Practices Act of 1974 prohibits mergers that sub-
stantially lessen competition in a market. Pre-merger notification, however, is
not compulsory. The Cooney Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs did propose in 1991 that merger notification be made
compulsory in Australia, but its recommendations were not implemented. In the
absence of pre-merger notification, the regulator - Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC) - can oppose anti-competitive mergers by seek-
ing court orders that prohibit such transactions before consummation, or impose
penalties, and/or force divestitures after completion. By contrast, both in the
U.S. and Europe, firms can face substantial fines for not notifying the regulator.
Merging parties in Australia can, however, voluntarily notify the ACCC of the
impending merger and seek an informal opinion about its anti-competitive effects,
although this does not provide immunity from the ACCC seeking court orders
after consummation of the merger.(8)
The result is a system of quasi-compulsory pre-merger notification. The
ACCC is considered a tough merger regulator who is willing to seek high penal-
ties from the courts if the parties proceed with mergers without seeking informal
clearance (Shekhar and Williams (2004)). The parties’ incentives to notify thus
increase in their belief that the merger would breach the anti-trust provisions and
the expected penalties would be high.
Under this system of merger notification, the process can unfold in one of
the two ways.(9) If the parties choose to proceed without notification, the ACCC
can investigate the merger either on its own or by the request of third parties,
(8) The only provision that grants immunity from prosecution for breaching the Trade Prac-
tices Act is an explicit authorization from the ACCC, which is granted if the regulator decides
that the merger is of net benefit to the public. However, this path is seldom taken as only eight
authorizations were sought between 1995 and 2001 (Williams and Woodbridge, 2004).
(9) Williams and Woodbridge (2004) provide a detailed description of this process.
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often the competitors who will be affected by the merger. For a merger that has
not been completed, the ACCC can decide to either leave it alone or raise anti-
trust concerns. In the latter case, the parties can withdraw the transaction, or
settle into a negotiated outcome, or proceed with the merger despite the ACCC’s
concerns. Should the parties choose the last option, it certainly leads to court
proceedings initiated by the ACCC, which may eventually lead to unwinding of
the merger. For a midnight merger that has been completed without notification,
negotiation is no longer an option: the ACCC either clears the merger or issues
court proceedings for breach of anti-trust provisions. Subsequently the parties can
choose to contest the orders, with courts deciding the final outcome.
If the parties do notify the ACCC, then the ACCC can give clearance or raise
antitrust concerns. The events that unfold subsequently are the same as those
for a merger that the ACCC investigates before it is completed. If the parties
expect the merger to raise anti-trust concerns, then they can make the option of
negotiation certain through notification. Without notification, they run the risk
of facing the ACCC’s challenge after the merger has been consummated.
The recently concluded merger between Toll Holdings Ltd. and Patrick Cor-
poration Ltd. illustrates the process. Toll initially chose not to notify the ACCC
of its merger intentions but sought clearance after its market announcement on
August 22, 2005. Its subsequent undertakings to address the ACCC’s anti-trust
concerns were deemed inadequate, leading the ACCC to eventually institute legal
proceedings in the Federal Court opposing the merger. Finally on March 1, 2006
Toll offered a new set of undertakings under the direction of the Federal Court,
which resulted in the ACCC discontinuing the legal proceedings.(10)
2.2. An extensive-form game of the merger process
We represent a merger by two parameters: b denotes the private benefits for
the parties to a merger; w denotes some proxy for welfare from the merger relevant
for merger policy, which we simply call social welfare.(11) To simplify analysis, we
(10) See http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/ itemId/724185/fromItemId/633100.
(11) For example, w can be the usual social welfare as in Besanko and Spulber (1989), or
a weighted average of consumer surplus and producer surplus, which the regulator uses as a
guideline for merger policy.
7
assume that b takes on either bh or bl with bh > bl ≥ 0. Similarly w ∈ {wl, wh}
with wh > wl. Note that we do not impose any sign restriction on w. Thus there
are four types of potential mergers: (bh, wh), (bh, wl), (bl, wh) and (bl, wl). Only
the parties to a merger know their type, and the regulator’s prior beliefs on the
types are given by probabilities p for bh, and q for wh. Since b and w may not
have any a priori relationship, we assume that p and q are independent.(12) Then
the probability of a merger to be of (bh, wl)-type, for example, is p(1 − q). The
parties’ objective is to maximize the private benefits less any costs involved. As
is standard in the literature on regulation, the regulator is assumed to maximize
social welfare less any enforcement costs.
We now describe the extensive form of the game, which is shown in Figure 1.
In the left part of Figure 1 corresponding to no notification, we consider only the
case where the regulator investigates the merger after it has been completed. For
mergers that are not notified and investigated before completion, the subsequent
events and the outcomes are essentially the same as those for notified mergers that
raise anti-trust concerns.
In the first stage of the game, the parties decide whether or not to notify. If
the parties do not notify, then the regulator may, at cost γ, investigate the merger
ex post either on its own or by the request of third parties. The investigation
reveals the type of merger for sure.(13) After the investigation, the regulator may
give clearance or issue proceedings. If the merger is cleared after investigation,
then the payoff for the parties is b, and that for the regulator is w − γ. In case
the regulator issues proceedings, the parties may contest the regulator’s decision,
which is followed by litigation. We assume that the probability that the court
finds contravention is fixed at pi ∈ (0, 1), which is exogenous and independent
of whether or not the parties elect to notify. That the court does not behave
strategically seems not only reasonable but is also standard in the literature on
regulation. If the parties lose the antitrust case, then the merger is unravelled
(12) As will become clear from our analysis, the case where w and b are correlated does not
alter our qualitative results. It only changes the equilibrium probability of investigation by the
regulator.
(13) More generally, the regulator could obtain some imperfect information about (b, w) after
the investigation. As this will not alter our qualitative conclusions, we assume, for expositional
simplicity, that the investigation reveals (b, w) completely.
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and the parties pay f , the penalty for antitrust infringement, and c, the litigation
cost which, under a simplified version of the Australian practice, is assumed to be
the sum of the costs incurred in the litigation by both parties. Thus the expected
payoff for the parties in case of litigation is pi(−c − f) + (1 − pi)b, and that for
the regulator is (1 − pi)w − c − γ. In the latter, we assume, as in Besanko and
Spulber (1989), that the penalty does not enter the regulator’s payoff since it is
viewed as a pure transfer between firms and consumers. On the other hand, the
litigation cost is subtracted from the regulator’s payoff as a whole since it is social
cost whether it is borne by the regulator or by the merging parties. If the parties
do not contest the regulator’s challenge, then the payoffs are −f for the parties
and −γ for the regulator.
— Figure 1 goes about here. —
Next is the subgame in which the parties notify their intention of merger.
Denote the cost of notification by n. This includes not only the direct cost incurred
in the process of notification, such as preparing documents and filing, but also the
reduced benefits due to notification delays and any information leakage that can
be exploited by speculators or rival bidders. If the parties notify their intention
of merger, the regulator reviews the case at cost γ′ < γ and learns (b, w) for sure.
Since notification provides the regulator with vast amount of information about
the proposed merger, it seems reasonable to assume that the cost of review is lower
than the cost of investigating a merger that was not notified. Based on the review,
the regulator can either give clearance or raise concerns. If the parties’ notification
is cleared, then the game ends with payoffs b − n for the parties, and w − γ′ for
the regulator. If the regulator raises concerns, then the parties have three options.
First, they may be given the choice of negotiation and asked to offer undertakings
to overcome the concerns raised by the regulator. Should this course of action be
taken, the parties’ merger benefits are reduced to b(1−α) where 0 < α < 1. The
regulator prefers the negotiated outcome to the status quo since the former leads
to higher social welfare.(14) Second, the parties can proceed with the transaction
(14) We do not need to specify how social welfare will change after negotiation. As will become
clear, all we need is that the social welfare from negotiation is not smaller than that from the
status quo.
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despite the regulator’s concerns. In this case, the regulator may give clearance
or challenge the merger in the court. Given that the regulator had not chosen to
clear the merger in the first place when notification was given, we can deduce that
the regulator will always challenge the merger that went ahead despite its express
concerns. The expected payoffs in this case are pi(−c − f) + (1 − pi)b − n for the
parties, and (1 − pi)w − c − γ′ for the regulator. The final option is to withdraw
the transaction.
Before we solve the game, we note that there are three main differences be-
tween notification and no notification. First, notification imposes additional no-
tification costs to the parties. Therefore the parties with strong conviction that
their merger would be cleared would opt for no notification. Second, the regulator
should review all cases that have been notified, while investigation is optional in
case of no notification. Although information provided through notification could
reduce the regulator’s cost of reviewing each application, compulsory notification
could drastically increase the regulator’s burden. Third, notification introduces
the option of negotiation. Thus if the regulator’s challenge and the court-found
contravention are highly likely, then the parties may be better off notifying and
negotiating a settlement, rather than becoming embroiled in risky litigation.
3. Equilibria of the Merger Notification Game
3.1. Equilibrium outcome under compulsory notification
In solving the whole game, we start with the subgame following the par-
ties’ notification. The equilibrium outcome of this subgame will be equivalent to
that for the game in which notification is compulsory. Let us first look at the
parties’ decision given the regulator’s concerns. If they choose negotiation, then
their payoff is b(1 − α) − n. If they decide to go ahead with the merger, then
the regulator challenges the merger for sure. Should the game reach this stage,
the parties will always contest the regulator’s decision. The other option of “no
contest” is strictly dominated since the payoff from negotiation is strictly larger
than that from “merger and no contest”. Since the expected payoff from “merger
and contest” is pi(−c − f) + (1 − pi)b − n, the parties will choose “negotiate” if
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pi(−c−f)+(1−pi)b−n ≤ b(1−α)−n or, equivalently, b ≤ pi(c+f)α−pi , and “merger and
contest” otherwise.(15) There are two cases to consider. First, if α ≤ pi, then the
parties will always choose “negotiate” since the probability of losing the antitrust
case is large relative to the reduction in private benefits from negotiation. To this,
the regulator’s best response is “raise concerns”. Second, if α > pi, then the parties
will choose “negotiate” if b ≤ pi(c+f)α−pi , and “merger and contest” otherwise. If the
parties choose “negotiate”, then the regulator’s best response is “raise concerns”.
However, if the parties choose “merger and contest”, then the regulator should
choose “clear” if w − γ′ ≥ (1− pi)w − c− γ′ or, equivalently, w ≥ − cpi , and “raise
concerns” otherwise. Summarizing, we have
Lemma 1: The equilibrium outcome under compulsory notification can be de-
scribed as:
(a) If α ≤ pi, then the regulator chooses “raise concerns” and the parties choose
“negotiate”;
(b) If α > pi and b ≤ pi(c+f)α−pi , then the regulator chooses “raise concerns” and the
parties choose “negotiate”;
(c) If α > pi, b > pi(c+f)α−pi , and w < − cpi , then the regulator chooses “raise concerns”
and the parties choose “merger and contest”;
(d) If α > pi, b > pi(c+f)α−pi , and w ≥ − cpi , then the regulator chooses “clear”.
In words, the equilibrium outcome under compulsory notification is always
“negotiate” if the reduction in private benefits is small relative to the cost of
losing the litigation (α ≤ pi). If α > pi, then all mergers are separated into three
groups: those with small private benefits are settled into a negotiated outcome;
those with large private benefits, but low social welfare are challenged by the
regulator and contested in the court; those with large private benefits and high
social welfare are cleared. Since the case where all parties settle into a negotiated
outcome is less interesting (and contrary to evidence), henceforth we will focus on
the case where α > pi. Moreover we maintain the following assumption.
Assumption 1: bh >
pi(c+f)
α−pi ≥ bl, wh ≥ − cpi ≥ wl.
(15) As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that the parties, when indifferent, choose the option
preferred by the regulator.
11
Assumption 2: n ≤ bl(1− α).
Assumption 1 is sufficient for the parties with different types of mergers to
behave differently under compulsory notification. Note that Assumption 1 implies
α > pi. Assumption 2 ensures that notification cost is not too high to prevent
(bl, wl)-type mergers from going ahead. Then from Lemma 1, the following is
immediate.
Proposition 2: Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium outcome under
compulsory notification has (a) (bh, wh)-type mergers cleared, (b) (bh, wl)-type
mergers challenged and contested in the court, and (c) (bl, wh)-type and (bl, wl)-
type mergers settled into negotiated outcomes.
3.2. Equilibrium outcome under voluntary notification
The game starts with the parties’ decision of whether or not to notify. In
the previous section, we have already described the equilibrium outcome of the
subgame that follows the parties’ notification. Suppose now the parties chose
not to notify. If the regulator chooses “investigate”, then the regulator learns
(b, w) for sure. If the regulator chooses “leave alone”, then the regulator does not
learn (b, w), so its payoff is the expected welfare denoted by Eµ(w˜), where the
expectation is with respect to the regulator’s beliefs µ about the types of merger
that went ahead. As this is the game of incomplete information, we solve the game
for perfect Bayesian equilibria.
We start by analyzing the subgame following the regulator’s investigation. If
the regulator issues proceedings, then the parties will choose “contest” if pi(−c−
f) + (1 − pi)b > −f or, equivalently, b > pic−(1−pi)f1−pi . If the parties contest the
regulator’s challenge, then the regulator’s best response is “issue proceedings” if
(1− pi)w− c− γ ≥ w− γ or, equivalently, w ≤ − cpi , and “clear” otherwise. If the
parties do not contest, then the regulator’s best response is “issue proceedings”
if w ≤ 0, and “clear” otherwise. Since pi(c+f)α−pi > pic−(1−pi)f1−pi , Assumption 1 is not
sufficient for the parties with different merger types to behave differently in the
subgame. Thus we make an additional assumption.
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Assumption 3: bl ≤ pic−(1−pi)f1−pi , wh ≥ 0.
Lemma 3: Given Assumptions 1 to 3, the subgame following the regulator’s
investigation has the equilibrium outcome: (a) (bh, wh) and (bl, wh)-type mergers
are cleared; (b) (bh, wl)-type mergers are challenged and contested in the court;
(c) (bl, wl)-type mergers are challenged and the parties offer no defense.
We now solve for perfect Bayesian equilibria of the whole game. Denote the
regulator’s probability of investigating an un-notified merger by σr. First, we
note from Lemma 3 that, given the regulator’s investigation, the only parties that
choose notification are those with (bl, wl)-type mergers. Consider the parties with
(bh, wh)-type mergers. They are strictly better off by not notifying: their payoff
from no notification is bh regardless of σr while their payoff from notification is
bh−n. Similarly, (bl, wh)-type mergers will not be notified since bl > bl(1−α)−n,
the latter being the payoff from the negotiated outcome after notification. Consider
now the parties with (bh, wl)-type mergers. If they notify, then their payoff is
pi(−c− f) + (1− pi)bh − n since their merger will be challenged and contested in
the court. If they do not notify, then their expected payoff is σr[pi(−c− f) + (1−
pi)bh] + (1− σr)bh. Thus they would not notify, either. Simply put, if they know
that their merger will be challenged and contested after notification, then they are
better off by not notifying. In the worst case where their merger is investigated,
they will contest the regulator’s challenge anyway, but save the cost of notification.
Finally, the parties with (bl, wl)-type mergers may notify depending on σr. If they
notify, then their payoff is bl(1−α)−n, that from negotiation. If they do not notify,
their expected payoff is σr(−f) + (1− σr)bl. Thus they will notify if σr > blα+nbl+f ,
not notify if σr < blα+nbl+f , and randomize notification if σr =
blα+n
bl+f
.(16)
Denote by σl the probability that the parties with (bl, wl)-type mergers choose
notification. Given σl, let µij be the regulator’s posterior belief that an un-notified
merger is of (bi, wj)-type, i, j = h, l. Then we have
µhh =
pq
(1− p)(1− q)(1− σl) + p+ q − pq ,
(16) Note that
blα+n
bl+f
< 1 by Assumption 2.
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µlh =
(1− p)q
(1− p)(1− q)(1− σl) + p+ q − pq ,
µhl =
p(1− q)
(1− p)(1− q)(1− σl) + p+ q − pq ,
µhh =
(1− p)(1− q)(1− σl)
(1− p)(1− q)(1− σl) + p+ q − pq . (1)
From the previous discussion, we know that the notification decision by the
parties with (bl, wl)-type mergers is given by
σl = 1 if σr >
blα+ n
bl + f
, ∈ [0, 1] if σr = blα+ n
bl + f
, = 0 if σr <
blα+ n
bl + f
. (2)
Given Lemma 3, the regulator’s investigation decision solves the following problem:
Maxσr σr
[
(µhh + µlh)wh + µhl((1− pi)wl − c)− γ
]
+(1− σr)
[
(µhh + µlh)wh + (µhl + µll)wl
]
. (3)
Thus the regulator will choose σr such that
σr = 1 if µhl > µˆ, ∈ [0, 1] if µhl = µˆ, = 0 if µhl < µˆ (4)
where µˆ = −µllwl+γpiwl+c . As is clear from (4), the regulator’s investigation decision
depends on its belief on mergers with (bh, wl)-type: if it is believed that more of
these types of mergers can go unchecked without investigation, the regulator will
increase its investigation effort. The following proposition, which is proved in the
appendix, solves for the entire set of perfect Bayesian equilibria.
Proposition 4: Suppose Assumptions 1 to 3 hold. Then in all perfect Bayesian
equilibria under voluntary notification, none of the parties except (bl, wl)-type
mergers choose notification and the outcomes for all un-notified mergers following
the regulator’s investigation are as in Lemma 3. The probability of notification by
the parties with (bl, wl)-type mergers (σl), the regulator’s investigation probability
(σr) and beliefs are given by:
(a) if wl < wˆ, then σl = σr = 1 and beliefs are as in (1) given σl = 1;
(b) if wl = wˆ, then σl = 1, σr ∈
(
blα+n
bl+f
, 1
]
and beliefs are as in (1) given σl = 1;
14
(c) if wˆ < wl < w˜, then σl = 1 +
p(1−q)(piwl+c+γ)+qγ
(1−p)(1−q)(wl+γ) ∈ (0, 1), σr = blα+nbl+f and
beliefs are as in (1) given σl;
(d) if wl = w˜, then σl = 0, σr ∈
[
0, blα+nbl+f
)
and beliefs are as in (1) given σl = 0;
(e) if wl > w˜, then σl = σr = 0 and beliefs are as in (1) given σl = 0;
where wˆ ≡ −p(1−q)c+(p+q−pq)γpip(1−q) < w˜ ≡ − p(1−q)c+γ(1−q)(1−p+ppi) .
In the first two types of equilibria, the social cost of undesirable merger (wl)
is large relative to the threshold value (wˆ), inducing the regulator to investigate
un-notified mergers with high probability. To this, the parties with (bl, wl)-type
mergers notify with probability one, hence separating themselves from other types
of mergers. The separating equilibria are more likely if wˆ increases; the derivatives
of wˆ with respect to relevant parameters show that wˆ increases in p but decreases
in q, c, and γ. Thus the separating equilibria are more likely if the proportion
of mergers with large private benefits (p) is large, the proportion of mergers with
positive social welfare (q) is small, and the costs of investigation and litigation are
small. As p increases, there are more mergers with large private benefits, which are
not notified. This prompts the regulator to increase its investigation effort, which
in turn induces the parties with (bl, wl)-type mergers to notify. The comparative
statics results with respect to the other three parameters are intuitively clear. In
separating equilibria, the benefits of signalling under voluntary notification may
not be large: while merging parties can save notification costs, the regulator’s
investigation costs can remain significant since it has to review all notified mergers
and investigate ex post a large proportion of un-notified mergers.
In the last two types of equilibria, called pooling equilibria, the social cost
of undesirable merger is not that large relative to the threshold value (w˜), and
the regulator investigates un-notified mergers with low probability. Consequently,
none of the parties choose notification. The pooling equilibria are more likely if
w˜ decreases; the derivatives of w˜ with respect to relevant parameters show that
w˜ decreases in p, q, c, and γ. Thus the pooling equilibria are more likely if the
proportion of mergers with large private benefits is large, the proportion of mergers
with positive social welfare is large, and the costs of investigation and litigation
are large. That the likelihood of pooling equilibria increases in p is due to the fact
that, as p increases, the proportion of mergers that will be potentially notified,
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i.e., (bl, wl)-type mergers, decreases. Again the comparatives statics results with
respect to the other three parameters are intuitively clear. While pooling equilibria
are certainly a theoretical possibility, the existence of various merger policies and
enforcement authorities suggests that the conditions for the pooling equilibria are
unlikely to hold in reality.
In view of reality, we may say that the third type of equilibrium, called the
hybrid equilibrium, is the most interesting and realistic case: the parties with
(bl, wl)-type mergers choose notification with probability less than one and the
regulator investigates un-notified mergers with probability less than one. The
hybrid equilibrium is more likely if w˜ − wˆ increases. Differentiating w˜ − wˆ with
respect to relevant parameters shows that w˜− wˆ increases in q, c, γ and decreases
in p. Thus the hybrid equilibrium is more likely to exist as there are more mergers
with small private benefits, the proportion of mergers with positive social welfare
increases, and the costs of litigation and investigation increase.
Before closing this section, we present numerical examples illustrating the
three types of equilibria under voluntary notification. Parameter values for our
base model are constructed as follows. First, we start with a merger with nega-
tive social welfare (wl) valued at $2 million. A typical legal cost (c) involved in
antitrust litigation is around 15% of un-trebled damages, which in our base case
becomes $0.3 million. The cost of investigating a merger (γ) is hard to quantify
and we approximate the lower bound of this cost based on the budget allocated by
the US Federal Trade Commission for its Objective 2.1, which is ‘identifying an-
ticompetitive mergers and practices that cause the greatest consumer injury’.(17)
The budget allocated for this objective in 2008 was around $11 million and, given
that the Federal Trade Commission receives about 4,500 merger notifications a
year, the cost per merger proposal becomes $2,500. Since there will be other costs
such as those incurred by the Department of Justice and other regulatory bodies,
we set the base value for investigation cost at $5,000. Next are the proportions of
mergers with large private benefits (p) and high social welfare (q). We infer this
information from the Australian merger data we use for the empirical analysis of
(17) “Fiscal Year 2008 Congressional Justification of Budget Summary, Federal Trade Commis-
sion” available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oed/fmo/budgetsummary08.pdf.
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this paper.(18) Given the total observation of 850 merger proposals, 547 proposals
are notified, out of which 35 proposals reach negotiated outcomes. According to
our theory, all notified mergers should reach negotiated settlement under volun-
tary notification, implying that the proportion of (bl, wl)-type mergers should be
(1− p)(1− q) = 35/850 = 0.041.(19) For the remaining 303 un-notified proposals,
8 are eventually objected to by the regulator. These are (bh, wl)-type mergers,
implying p(1 − q) = 8/850 = 0.0094. Solving these two leads us to p = 0.19
and q = 0.95. Finally we set pi = 0.97. Thus parameter values for our base
model are c = 0.3, γ = 0.05, p = 0.19, q = 0.95 and pi = 0.97. This base
model admits the hybrid equilibrium since, given the parameter values, we have
wˆ = −5.52 < wl = −2 < w˜ = −1.06.(20)
In Figure 2, the dotted line plots the values of w˜ and the solid line plots the
values of wˆ as various parameter values change. In the first example, we change the
value of p from 0.1 to 0.28. The figure confirms that the hybrid equilibrium is more
likely at low values of p while, as p increases, the other two types of equilibrium
become more likely. Moreover, if the legal cost is proportional to the size of wl, say
15%, then the only equilibrium consistent with our theory is the hybrid equilibrium
at all values of p in the range. This is because the implied value of wl is -2, which
is within the interval (wˆ, w˜) at all values of p. In the second example, we change
the value of q from 0.8 to 0.97. In the third example, the value of c is changed
from 0.2 to 0.38 while, in the last example, the value of γ is changed from 0.03 to
0.12. As explained above, the pattern of how different types of equilibria emerge
is similar when q, c and γ change. Overall the examples illustrate how voluntary
notification leads to different types of equilibria depending on various parameter
values, something that cannot be observed under compulsory notification.
— Figure 2 goes about here. —
(18) Detailed figures are reported in Table 2 in Section 4.2.
(19) As shown in Table 2, a majority of notified mergers are not objected to by the regulator,
implying that the parties’ notification decisions involve factors that are beyond the model of this
paper.
(20) If we assume all 547 notified mergers are of (bl, wl)-type instead, then we have p = 0.014
and q = 0.347 in our base case. Calculating wˆ and w˜ again, we are led to wˆ = −2.32 and
w˜ = −0.08. Given wl = −2, this implies once more that the base case admits the hybrid
equilibrium.
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The above examples illustrate the case where the social cost of undesirable
merger is not very large relative to the costs of investigation and litigation. Given
the parameter values of our base example, the maximum social cost of anticom-
petitive merger that admits the hybrid equilibrium is $5.52 million compared to
the litigation cost of $0.3 million and investigation cost of $0.05 million. If the
social cost of undesirable merger becomes considerably larger, however, then one
would expect the separating equilibria instead. For example, if wl = −$10 million
in our base case, then we are led to the separating equilibria whether the litigation
cost stays at $0.3 million or increases to $1.5 million, a 15% of the damages. In
the end, which type of equilibrium is more likely under voluntary notification is
an empirical issue. We note, however, that the Australian experience of voluntary
notification suggests that it is very unlikely for an anticompetitive merger with
significant social costs to reach completion without the regulator’s challenge. For
mergers with considerable social costs, the regulator can always resort to legal
remedies.
3.3. Comparing compulsory and voluntary notification regimes
One of the key differences between the compulsory and voluntary notification
regimes is that, under the former, the parties have the opportunity to negotiate
with the regulator before the merger is consummated, thereby avoiding costly
litigation. This is the main rationale for, and the potential benefits of compulsory
notification. On the other hand, the regulator would insist on the negotiated
outcome at the cost to the merging parties even if there is only a small gain in
social welfare. Indeed, as Proposition 2 shows, all mergers with low private benefits
are negotiated under compulsory notification. Then it is straightforward to see
that all parties to a merger would prefer voluntary notification to compulsory
notification.
How do the benefits from compulsory notification weigh up against its costs?
The main costs of compulsory notification are the costs for the regulator of review-
ing each and every submission from merging parties, and the costs of notification
for the merging parties. As we mentioned earlier, the available evidence sug-
gests that significant part of these costs may be unnecessary. Under voluntary
notification, large part of such costs can be avoided. For example, in the hybrid
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equilibrium of Proposition 4, only (bl, wl)-type mergers are notified and reviewed,
and the others are randomly investigated ex post. Voluntary notification certainly
benefits the merging parties by alleviating their notification burden if their trans-
actions are not likely to raise antitrust concerns. While the regulator’s cost of
investigating a merger ex post (γ in our notation) could be higher than that of
reviewing a notified merger (γ′ in our notation), the number of cases to be in-
vestigated ex post could be considerably lower than the total number of mergers,
all of which have to be reviewed under compulsory notification. In the hybrid
equilibrium under voluntary notification, the proportion of un-notified mergers to
be investigated ex post is blα+nbl+f .
Then, does voluntary notification increase the likelihood of litigation? In our
analysis, only the parties with (bh, wl)-type mergers proceed with the merger, and
contest the regulator’s challenge in the court. Given the choice of notification,
these parties will opt for no notification since, even with the regulator’s investiga-
tion, the same outcome is expected, but without notification cost. All other types
of mergers are either cleared or reach out-of-court settlement. In case of compul-
sory notification, (bh, wl)-type mergers are always contested in the court. Since
(bh, wl)-type mergers are investigated with probability at most one when notifica-
tion is an option, the likelihood of litigation is actually smaller under voluntary
notification.
Finally, we compare social welfare and associated costs under the two notifi-
cation regimes. The option of negotiation certainly opens up a potential for higher
social welfare under compulsory notification. The benefits of higher social welfare
come primarily from three types of mergers. First, the parties with (bl, wh)-type
mergers choose not to notify under voluntary notification, with resulting social
welfare wh. Under compulsory notification, they choose negotiated settlement,
which leads to higher social welfare. Second, the parties with (bl, wl)-type mergers
may choose not to notify under voluntary notification. If they are not investigated
ex post, then the resulting social welfare is wl, lower than that from the negoti-
ated settlement under compulsory notification. Third, (bh, wl)-type mergers are
contested in the court under compulsory notification while, under voluntary no-
tification, they will be only when they are investigated ex post. Insofar as the
regulator investigates un-notified mergers with probability less than one, there is
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potential welfare loss from leaving socially undesirable (bh, wl)-type mergers un-
contested. In the end, the choice between compulsory or voluntary notification
should depend on weighing the potential benefits of higher social welfare from ne-
gotiation against the costs discussed above. Needless to say, voluntary notification
will dominate compulsory notification if the reduction in various costs outweighs
the increase in welfare from negotiation.
To see more clearly the cost and benefit comparison of the two notification
regimes, we revisit the numerical example presented in Section 3.2. We continue
to set parameter values at c = 0.3, γ = 0.05, p = 0.19, q = 0.95, wl = −2, pi =
0.97, while the remaining parameter values are set at γ′ = 0.04, bl = 2, n =
0.6, α = 0.5 and, assuming treble damages, f = 6. These parameter values
satisfy Assumptions 1 to 3. Given this, the unique equilibrium is the hybrid-type
since wˆ = −5.52 and w˜ = −1.06, and is given by σl = 0.996 and σr = 0.2. We now
calculate the reduction in various costs per merger when the notification regime
changes from the compulsory one to the voluntary one. First, the reduction in
notification costs is n[pq+p(1−q)+(1−p)q+(1−σl)(1−p)(1−q)] = 0.576. The
first three terms inside the brackets correspond to all but (bl, wl)-type mergers that
are not notified under voluntary notification, while the last term corresponds to
(bl, wl)-type mergers that are notified with probability σl. Second, the reduction
in the regulator’s investigation costs is γ − {γ′σl(1 − p)(1 − q) + γσr[pq + p(1 −
q) + (1 − p)q + (1 − σl)(1 − p)(1 − q)]
}
= 0.038. The first term inside the curly
brackets is the cost of investigating (bl, wl)-type mergers that are notified with
probability σl and the remaining terms correspond to the costs of investigating
un-notified mergers with probability σr. Third, the reduction in litigation costs
is c(1 − σr)p(1 − q) = 0.002 since (bh, wl)-type mergers are taken to the court
with probability one under compulsory notification, but with probability σr under
voluntary notification. Altogether total reduction in costs is 0.617.
Next, we calculate the reduced welfare under voluntary notification. It comes
from three types of mergers. First, (bl, wl)-type mergers are negotiated with prob-
ability one under compulsory notification but only with probability σl under vol-
untary notification. Suppose an increase in welfare from negotiation is δl for this
type of merger. Then total welfare under compulsory notification is wl+δl. Under
voluntary notification, it is notified and negotiated with probability σl, resulting
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in welfare of wl+ δl. When it is not notified, there are two possibilities. First, it
is investigated with probability σr, in which case the merger is unravelled, lead-
ing to zero welfare. Second, if it is not investigated with probability 1 − σr, the
resulting welfare is wl. In sum, total welfare from a (bl, wl)-type merger under
voluntary notification is σl(wl + δl) + (1− σl)(1− σr)wl. Thus the difference in
welfare is (1− σl)(σrwl + δl) and, since the proportion of (bl, wl)-type mergers is
(1 − p)(1 − q), the change in welfare is (1 − p)(1 − q)(1 − σl)(σrwl + δl). Given
σl = 0.996, this is close to zero if δl is not too large. So we ignore this term. The
second source of welfare loss is from (bl, wh)-type mergers. They are negotiated
with probability one under compulsory notification but always cleared under vol-
untary notification with or without investigation. If an increase in social welfare
from negotiation is δh for this type of merger, then the reduced welfare under vol-
untary notification is δh(1 − p)q. Finally, (bh, wl)-type mergers are contested in
the court with probability one under compulsory notification, leading to expected
welfare of (1−pi)wl. Under voluntary notification, they are investigated and con-
tested in the court with probability σr, or left uncontested with probability 1−σr.
Thus expected welfare under voluntary notification for a (bh, wl)-type merger is
σr(1− pi)wl + (1− σr)wl, and the difference in welfare under the two notification
regimes is −pi(1 − σr)wl. Given that the proportion of (bh, wl)-type mergers is
p(1 − q), the change in welfare is −p(1 − q)pi(1 − σr)wl = 0.015. Clearly the
total welfare loss under voluntary notification relative to compulsory notification
depends on the size of δh. If δh = 0.783, then δh(1 − p)q = 0.602 so that the
total welfare loss under voluntary notification is 0.617, which offsets the total re-
duction in various costs calculated above. Therefore for all δh ≤ 0.783, voluntary
notification dominates compulsory notification.
While the above example illustrates potential benefits of voluntary notifi-
cation, the comparison of the costs and benefits is ultimately an empirical issue,
which requires, among others, estimating various parameter values. Although var-
ious costs and private benefits can be reasonably estimated, we are not aware of
studies that satisfactorily - or even unsatisfactorily - estimate social cost/welfare of
merger, let alone the change in social cost/welfare from negotiation. The latter is
likely to be due to the paucity of jurisdictions with voluntary merger notification.
In the next section, we offer some exploratory empirical results from Australia
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where merger notification is voluntary.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Empirical implications and prior studies
In the previous section, we have characterized equilibrium outcomes from the
two notification regimes. In case of voluntary notification, we have also identified
conditions under which the hybrid equilibrium exists. In view of reality, we focus
on the hybrid equilibrium. Then our main theoretical results are summarized in
Table 1.
— Table 1 goes about here. —
Table 1 leads to the following implications. First, only the mergers with small
private benefits and low social welfare are notified, and subsequently settled into
negotiated outcomes. No other types of mergers are notified. Among these, merg-
ers with high social welfare are cleared after investigation, and those with large
private benefits but low social welfare are challenged by the regulator and con-
tested in the court. Second, mergers that are not notified are investigated with
a positive probability, which increases in the cost of notification and decreases
in the penalty for antitrust infringement. Third, mergers with large private ben-
efits are either cleared or contested in the court under compulsory notification.
Fourth, voluntary notification does not lead to more litigation than compulsory
notification.
To test whether our predictions have empirical support, we need to measure
the three primary components of our model. These are private benefits to merging
parties, costs (both notification and investigative), and social benefits. There is an
extensive literature that estimates benefits to merging parties.(21) This literature
essentially relies on the traditional event-study methodology to estimate abnormal
returns - which are considered equivalent to private benefits - to merging parties
(21) See, for example, Eckbo (1992), Brady and Feinberg (2000), Aktas et al. (2004), Fee and
Thomas (2004), and Shahrur (2005).
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around announcement dates and on the announcement of regulatory challenges. As
indicated in Bruner (2002), bulk of this evidence indicates statistically significant
positive returns to targets, whereas bidders typically experience small negative
returns on merger announcement. The combined abnormal returns are typically
positive, although much of the gain is limited to target shareholders.
Measuring a merger’s associated notification and enforcement costs and social
benefits proves to be more elusive. As mentioned earlier, a study commissioned
by International Competition Network has estimated average notification costs
over multiple jurisdictions to be as much as 3.28 million euros. As several fee-
charging jurisdictions do so to recover the cost of merger review,(22) this estimate
may be considered a proxy for enforcement costs as well. Social benefits can
comprise effects on all other parties including customers, suppliers, and rivals. In
a study of anti-trust challenge of steel companies’ merger in 1901, Mullins et al.
(1995) find that railroads (who were major customers of steel mills) experienced
positive abnormal returns, suggesting that proposed merger would have resulted
in negative social benefit. Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) explore use of simulation to
assess anti-competitive effects of Volvo-Scania merger that was proposed in 1999
but disallowed by the European Commission. Finally, recent studies by Shahrur
(2005) and Fee and Thomas (2004) present results that imply that overall effects
of mergers on other parties are ambiguous. Notably, neither of the two studies
directly measures social benefits per se, focus only on limited samples of horizontal
takeovers, and use input-output tables to identify the other parties.
4.2. Data & Results
In light of the preceding discussion, the issues related to measurement of costs
and social benefits of mergers remain largely unresolved. Therefore in what follows
we only conduct analyses that measure private benefits to the merging parties. Our
primary unit of analysis is solely whether or not firms choose to notify the regulator
of an impending merger. As observed by Aktas et al. (2004), if markets are infor-
mationally efficient, then announcement returns must incorporate the likelihood
(22) See Merger Notification Filing Fees, April 2005. Available at International Competition
Network (www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.)
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of regulatory response to the proposal. In Australia, the regulatory response itself
may be conditioned on the choice exercised by the parties.(23) Further, announce-
ment returns may also be influenced by other relevant factors that may need to be
controlled for.(24) As we are unable to isolate the effects of merger-related costs
and the regulatory factors on announcement returns, our empirical results must
be interpreted in view of these observations and may be considered as indicative
only. Nevertheless, our results do suggest that the voluntary notification regime in
Australia leads to the results similar to what have been obtained in other studies
where notification is compulsory.
We begin with a sample of mergers used by Shekhar and Williams (2004).
They compile a sample of 850 mergers between January 1996 and June 2002 from
the ACCC’s public register. To conduct an event study to measure private benefits
of mergers, we collect price data from SIRCA for all sample companies that are
publicly traded in Australia.(25) We also note the event date as the earliest date
a merger proposal can be identified publicly. The final sample consists of 126
self-reported transactions and 44 transactions reported by other sources. Table 2
reports the summary statistics.
— Table 2 goes about here. —
Table 2 shows that notified mergers are more likely to be objected to by
the ACCC, but also more likely to proceed to completion after negotiation. It
also shows that a significant number of mergers (36%) are not notified, indicating
significant possible savings in notification costs.(26) A majority of mergers that
are not notified and investigated ex post are not objected to by the ACCC. Fi-
nally a small number of un-notified mergers reach negotiated settlements. These
(23) This further encompasses other consequences associated with the choice such as notification
costs, delays in achieving regulatory approval, litigation costs involved in challenging regulatory
decisions, etc.
(24) Bruner (2002) provides a detailed survey of studies that have analyzed these “deal-specific”
factors such as form of the offer, business overlap etc.
(25) Similar to issues faced by Aktas et al. (2004), a large number of mergers in the original
sample involve either a merger between private parties or firms with no readily available price
data. Several mergers involve a foreign acquirer, and others involve foreign parents who own
privately-held subsidiaries that operate in Australia.
(26) Shekhar and Williams (2004) also report that notified mergers take longer to complete.
Average delay to completion is 72 days for notified mergers and 66 days for un-notified mergers.
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are mergers that are not notified initially but investigated by the ACCC before
completion.
Consistent with previous literature, we treat merger-related abnormal returns
to be appropriate proxies for private benefits to the firms involved. To estimate
the private benefits, we estimate the market model for all companies and calculate
the abnormal returns around the event date. The abnormal return is defined as
the difference between the actual return and the estimated return as
ARit = R˜it − [αi + βiRmt + it] (5)
where company i’s equilibrium return at time t, is described as a function of a
constant αi, the corresponding market returns Rmt, and an error term it. We
used the daily return on the All Ordinaries Accumulated Index as the proxy for
the market return. The market model is estimated for each firm by using daily
returns for a period of approximately 255 days and stopping 15 days before the
event date.(27)
The results for cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for various
intervals around the event date are reported in Table 3. In the table, returns
are computed for 148 notifying firms and 50 non-notifying firms for which price
data are available. The reported portfolio CAARs are computed by using equally
weighted abnormal returns for firms as computed from the market model. Panel
A of Table 3 is based on the full sample, and Panels B and C are based on sub-
samples.(28)
As noted earlier, current literature provides little guidance in how merger-
related costs and welfare benefits may be measured. Abstracting away from these
(27) Stopping 15 days before the event date ensures that the equilibrium returns model is not
contaminated by unusual price movements due to rumors, information leakage, and so on, which
are related to the impending merger announcement.
(28) We also re-ran the tests reported in Table 3 using three different weighting schemes as
follows. First, we used weights estimated by using the constituent firms’ end-of-month market
value of equity, measured approximately three months before the event date. Second, we used
weights based on the inverse of the measured standard deviation of firm raw returns, where
returns are calculated over the estimation period. Third, we used weights based on the inverse of
the measured standard deviation of residuals for firm returns, where residuals are calculated over
the estimation period. In all three cases, inferences pertaining to differences in average returns
(for each pair of sub-samples) remain unchanged. The details are available upon request from
the authors. However, we note that, in short-horizon event studies such as ours, standardizing
abnormal returns typically makes little difference to the test statistic (Brown and Warner (1985),
Kothari and Warner (2007)).
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issues, our primary interest therefore lies in testing whether the perceived private
benefits due to the merger are indeed different for firms in light of their reporting
choice. In Panel A, we report average returns for all notified and un-notified merg-
ers. Although all returns are positive, there is no statistically significant difference
between mean returns of the two portfolios, suggesting that on average, neither of
the two groups is better or worse off by choosing alternative notification method.
In other words, estimated private benefits from proposed mergers are similar across
the two sub-samples. For our sample, returns to notified mergers are conditioned
by increased likelihood of regulatory objection and of a negotiated settlement. Re-
turns to un-notified mergers are also subject to similar concerns, albeit with lower
likelihood but conditioned on lower likelihood of reaching a settlement.
— Table 3 goes about here. —
In Panel B, we report the abnormal returns for firms in the two groups condi-
tioned on the ACCC raising no objection to the proposal. As shown previously in
Table 2, and consistent with full sample results in Shekhar and Williams (2004),
a larger proportion of sample firms involved in un-notified mergers do not face
regulatory objections. All returns are positive and statistically significant over
all intervals, but of interest to us is the difference between returns for the two
sub-samples. Parametric t-tests indicate no difference, although non-parametric
tests suggest that un-notified mergers experience higher abnormal returns over
the longest interval. This is consistent with our theoretical findings: the parties
that choose no notification have private benefits at least as large as those of the
parties that choose notification. Another possible interpretation is that lower re-
turns for notified group may be attributed to both the notification costs already
incurred and to the delay in merger completion as parties must now wait for the
ACCC’s clearance before consummation. As a vast majority of notified mergers
are eventually cleared, a greater proportion of notifying firms could consider the
other alternative available if they are reasonably confident that their transactions
are not likely to raise antitrust concerns.
In Panel C, we report the abnormal returns for objected mergers. Notified
and objected mergers experience positive abnormal returns, and these results are
somewhat consistent with those reported for compulsory notification regimes in
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Europe and US, as both Aktas et al.(2004) and Fee and Thomas (2004) report
strong positive returns for objected mergers in their respective samples. In general,
these positive returns are consistent with the notion that a negotiated settlement
with regulator is likely. The one un-notified, objected merger in our sample ex-
hibits negative returns, a result that is contrary to our theoretical predictions:
mergers that are not notified but challenged have high private benefits and low so-
cial welfare. However the sample size in Panel C precludes even a basic statistical
test for the difference in mean returns.
5. Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we have compared the prevailing system of compulsory pre-merger
notification with the Australian system of voluntary pre-merger notification. Un-
der voluntary notification, we have shown that, for a non-trivial set of parameter
values, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in mixed strategies in which the regu-
lator investigates un-notified mergers with probability less than one and all mergers
are divided into three groups: only those with small private benefits and low social
welfare are notified and settled into negotiated outcomes; those with high social
welfare are not notified and, even if investigated ex post by the regulator, cleared;
those with large private benefits and low social welfare are not notified and, when
investigated ex post by the regulator, challenged at the court. These outcomes are
similar to those when notification is compulsory. The main difference is that, un-
der compulsory notification, all mergers with small private benefits are settled into
negotiated outcomes. On the other hand, voluntary notification leads to substan-
tial savings in the enforcement costs for the regulator and the notification costs
for the merging parties. Moreover, voluntary notification does not lead to more
litigation than compulsory notification. Therefore the choice of compulsory or
voluntary notification should depend on weighing the potential benefits of higher
social welfare from negotiation against the reduction in various costs related to
enforcement, notification, and litigation.
We have also conducted exploratory tests of our empirical implications for
merger data from Australia where there is no legal requirement for pre-merger no-
tification. Previously reported results support our contention that notified mergers
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are more likely to enter into negotiated outcomes. Estimation of private benefits to
parties via abnormal market returns indicates that there is no significant difference
between notified and un-notified mergers. It is also found that, for mergers that
are not objected to by the ACCC, notifying parties experience lower abnormal
returns than those that choose not to notify. Although the empirical results are
not unambiguous since a vast majority of notified mergers are cleared eventually,
the difference may be attributed to both notification costs and the delay in waiting
for clearance from the ACCC. At least some of these firms could avoid these costs
by not notifying and just proceeding with the merger. It is also possible that firms
feel compelled to notify - play it safe - as the ACCC’s antitrust guidelines are
not clear and their implementation is not yet deeply rooted in precedence. How-
ever, notification does not guarantee a negotiated settlement, although instances
of litigation are rare.
To have a more accurate assessment of the voluntary notification vis-a`-vis the
compulsory notification regimes, more work needs to be done to incorporate the
measures of social welfare, enforcement costs for the regulator, and notification-
related costs for the parties. However, our theoretical predictions, empirical find-
ings on the market reaction, the rarity of litigation or contentious mergers that
went ahead without notification, all seem to suggest that the voluntary notifica-
tion system in Australia may achieve objectives similar to those of a compulsory
notification system at lower overall costs to all the involved parties.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
We divide the solution to the regulator’s problem (4) into three cases.
(Case 1): µhl > µˆ. Then σr = 1, which implies σl = 1 from (2). Then from
(1), we have µhl =
p(1−q)
p+q−pq , µll = 0 and, therefore, µˆ = − γpiwl+c . Thus µhl > µˆ
is equivalent to wl < −p(1−q)c+(p+q−pq)γpip(1−q) ≡ wˆ. In sum, if wl < wˆ, then an
equilibrium exists where σl = σr = 1 and the regulator’s beliefs are as in (1) given
σl = 1.
(Case 2): µhl = µˆ. Then σr ∈ [0, 1]. We divide this case further into three cases
based on (2), the parties’ notification decision.
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(Case 2-1): σr > blα+nbl+f . Then σl = 1 and the regulator’s beliefs are the
same as in (Case 1), and µhl = µˆ implies wl = wˆ. Therefore, if wl = wˆ, then an
equilibrium exists where σl = 1, blα+nbl+f < σr ≤ 1, and the regulator’s beliefs are as
in (1) given σl = 1.
(Case 2-2): σr = blα+nbl+f . Then σl ∈ [0, 1] and the regulator’s beliefs are as
in (1). Solving µhl = µˆ for σl leads us to σl = 1 +
p(1−q)(piwl+c+γ)+qγ
(1−p)(1−q)(wl+γ) . Since
σl ∈ [0, 1], we must have p(1−q)(piwl+c+γ)+qγ(1−p)(1−q)(wl+γ) ∈ [−1, 0]. Solving the inequalities
gives us wl ∈ [wˆ, w˜] where wˆ is as defined in (Case 1) and w˜ ≡ − p(1−q)c+γ(1−q)(1−p+ppi) .
It remains to show wˆ < w˜ so that [wˆ, w˜] is not empty. For this, direct calculation
leads to pip(1 − q)(1 − p + ppi)(w˜ − wˆ) = p(1 − p)(1 − q)c + γ(1 − p)[p(1 − pi) +
q(1 − p + ppi)] > 0. In sum, if wˆ ≤ wl ≤ w˜, then an equilibrium exists where
σl = 1 +
p(1−q)(piwl+c+γ)+qγ
(1−p)(1−q)(wl+γ) , σr =
blα+n
bl+f
, and the regulator’s beliefs are as in (1)
given the above σl.
(Case 2-3): σr < blα+nbl+f . Then σl = 0 and the regulator’s beliefs are equal to
its prior. In this case, we have µhl = µˆ if wl = w˜. Therefore, if wl = w˜, then an
equilibrium exists where σl = 0, 0 ≤ σr < blα+nbl+f , and the regulator’s beliefs are
as in (1) given σl = 0.
(Case 3): µhl < µˆ. Then σr = 0, which implies σl = 0 from (2). Then the
regulator’s beliefs are again equal to its prior. Given this, it is easy to show
µhl < µˆ if wl > wˆl. Therefore, if wl > w˜, then an equilibrium exists where
σl = σr = 0 and the regulator’s beliefs are as in (1) given σl = 0.
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Figure 1 - Extensive Form of the Australian Regulatory Game 
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Figure 2 – Equilibria under voluntary notification 
 
-11
-9
-7
-5
-3
-1
1
0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28
Proportion of mergers with large private benefits
So
ci
al
 c
os
t o
f m
er
ge
r
Separating equilibria
Hybrid equilibrium
Pooling equilibria
 
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
0.8 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.9 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96
Proportion of mergers with positive social welfare
So
ci
al
 c
os
t o
f m
er
ge
r
Pooling equilibria
Hybrid equilibrium
Separating equilibria
 
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
0.2 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38
Litigation costs 
So
ci
al
 c
os
t o
f m
er
ge
r
Pooling equilibria
Hybrid equilibrium
Separating equilibria
 
-15
-13
-11
-9
-7
-5
-3
-1
1
3
0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05 0.055 0.06 0.065 0.07 0.075 0.08 0.085 0.09 0.095 0.1 0.105 0.11 0.115 0.12
Investigation costs
S
oc
ia
l c
os
t o
f m
er
ge
r
Pooling equilibria
Hybrid equilibrium
Separating equilibria
 
 
Table 1: Outcomes under Two Notification Regimes 
 
 Compulsory notification 
(Proposition 2) 
Voluntary notification 
(Proposition 4) 
(bl, wl) negotiation notification/negotiation  or 
no notification/no defense 
(bl, wh) negotiation no notification/clear 
(bh, wl) court challenge no notification/court challenge 
(bh, wh) clear no notification/clear 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Summary statistics of merger proposals considered (and decided upon) by the ACCC 
over the period of January 1996 – June 2002. Data are collected from information disclosed on 
the ACCC public register. The proposals are classified according to the identity of the notifying 
party. The companies proposing the merger must be one of the notifying parties for the 
transaction to be classified under “Initiated by Parties”. If notification is received from sources 
other than the companies in question, the proposal is classified as “Initiated by Others”. Mergers 
are classified as Objected if the ACCC raised concerns, and Not Objected otherwise. Panel A is 
for the full sample whereas Panel B reports the summary statistics for transactions where stock 
price data are available for at least one of the merging firms and the firm is listed in Australia.  
 
 
Panel A -  All Merger Proposals 
 
   N Not Objected  Objected Renegotiated  Withdrawn
Initiated by Parties 547 499 (91.22%) 48 (8.77%) 35 (6.39%) 13 (2.37%) 
Initiated by Others 303 295 (97.35%) 8 (2.64%) 2 (0.66%) 6 (1.98%) 
 
Panel B  -  Merger Proposals by firms with price data available  
   
   N Not Objected  Objected Renegotiated  Withdrawn
Initiated by Parties 126 102 (81%) 24 (19%) 17 (13.49%) 7 (5.55%) 
Initiated by Others 44 43 (97.72%) 1 (2.27%) 0 (0%)  1 (2.27%) 
 
 
Panel A is based on summary statistics presented in Shekhar and Williams (2004). 
 
 
Table 3 – Cumulative average abnormal returns around the event date for equally weighted 
portfolios of all firms. Portfolios consist of all firms (acquirers and targets) for whom price data is 
available. Notified consists of all firms that notify ACCC of their merger plans, whereas Not 
Notified consists of firms that do not. If ACCC raises concerns, mergers are classified as 
Objected, Not objected otherwise. Abnormal returns are the residuals of the market model, which 
is estimated using up to one year’s returns prior to event date. Returns significantly different from 
zero are italicized. Test statistics for difference of means (t-statistics for parametric test and z-
statistic for Wilcoxon rank test) are also reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A - Notified vs. Not Notified mergers, all firms 
Interval (-1, 1) (-1, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (-2, 2) 
Notified (N=148) 4.83% 2.7% 2.44% 4.55% 5.32% 
Not Notified (N=50) 5.32% 5.08% 3.65% 3.84% 7.57% 
t-statistic 0.26 1.48 0.9 -0.44 1.06 
z-statistic 0.24 1.46 0.48 -0.124 0.897 
Panel B - Notified vs. Not Notified mergers, not objected mergers only 
Interval (-1, 1) (-1, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (-2, 2) 
Notified (N=120) 3.75% 2.75% 2.58% 3.51% 4.12% 
Not Notified (N=49) 5.59% 5.32% 3.85% 4.07% 7.88% 
t-statistic -0.98 -1.55 -0.91 -0.34 -1.75 
z-statistic 1.05 1.89* 0.824 0.594 1.716* 
Panel C - Notified vs. Not Notified mergers, objected mergers only 
Interval (-1, 1) (-1, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (-2, 2) 
Notified (N=28) 9.34% 2.435% 1.67% 9.015% 10.39% 
Not Notified (N=1) -8.24% -7.0% -6.23% -7.48% -7.81% 
t-statistic - - - - - 
z-statistic -1.61 -1.58 -1.576 -1.6 -1.61 
 
 
